Ashwin_Yuki

=**AFF**=

Allen 12 (Greg – NPR, “U.S. Watches Closely As Oil Drilling Begins Off Cuba”, 2/13, http://www.npr.org/2012/02/13/146635957/u-s-watches-closely-as-oil-drilling-begins-off-cuba)

There are big plans for oil exploration in the Caribbean, //not far off// the coast of Florida. A Spanish company recently began drilling in Cuban waters — just 55 miles from Key West. The well is the first of several exploratory wells planned in Cuba and the Bahamas. The drilling has officials and researchers in Florida scrambling to make plans for how they'll respond in case of a spill. The U.S. currently doesn't allow any drilling for oil off its Atlantic coast or in the eastern Gulf of Mexico. One reason is what's at stake. Florida's tourism-based economy depends on its beaches, fishing and clear Caribbean water. Environmental Concerns The U.S. ban on drilling off of Florida, however, //doesn't affect// America's Caribbean neighbors. The exploratory well being drilled off of Cuba has many here concerned, including people like Richard Dodge. Dodge is the dean of Nova Southeastern University's Oceanographic Center in Dania Beach, near Fort Lauderdale, and what he's really concerned about is coral. At the school, Dodge and his graduate students raise staghorn coral in outdoor saltwater tanks. Live coral grow in the crystal-clear water, some just finger length. "These are relatively new ones that we're starting out," Dodge says. "But over here, these are ones we'll be transplanting to the wild." In another tank, large branches of coral will soon be used to help restore damaged reefs. Florida is home to //more than three-quarters// of the nation's coral reefs — and they haven't been doing so well. Development and warming oceans have already weakened many. On a map, Dodge points out the location of what he believes is an even //bigger potential threat// — the spot where Cuba has approved offshore oil drilling. " The site that will be drilled, " he says, " is //only about 50 miles// from Key West ." The rig drilling off Cuba's northern coast is operating in water that is more than a mile deep. But it's not the depth that concerns Dodge. In the case of a blowout, it's the //operation's proximity// to the Gulf Stream. "We're worried that it could get into that stream fast and therefore, within days, //impact our coastal ecosystem// and coastline," Dodge says. A spill could potentially affect //hundreds of miles// of beaches, mangroves and estuaries from the Keys to Palm Beach. Dodge and other marine scientists in Florida are asking the federal government to fund research that would help identify the resources most at risk, and develop guidelines to protect them. Embargo Could Complicate Cleanup Complicating matters is the fact that this new well is being drilled in the waters of a country that's under a strict U.S. embargo.Unless they apply for and receive special permission from the government, U.S. companies are //banned from doing any work// on the well — even if there's a spill.

ORR 12 (Office of Response and Restoration – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Getting Ready for Offshore Oil Drilling in Cuba and the Bahamas”, 4/27, http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/getting-ready-offshore-oil-drilling-cuba-and-bahamas.html)

For the past year, NOAA and the U.S. Coast Guard have been studying the //possible threats// that new offshore oil drilling activity near the Florida Straits and the Bahamas pose to Florida. For example, the //proximity// of Cuba's oil fields to U.S. waters has raised a lot of concerns about what would happen if a spill like the 2010 Deepwater Horizon/BP oil well blowout happened. If a large oil spill did occur in the waters northwest of Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry the oil to U.S. waters and coastal areas in Florida. However, a number of factors, like winds or currents, would determine where any oil slicks might go. NOAA's National Ocean Service has more information about how we're preparing for worst-case scenarios there: The study focuses on //modeling// the movement of oil in water to //predict// where, when, and how oil might reach U.S. shores given a spill in this region of the ocean. Models help to determine the threat to our coasts from a potential spill by accounting for many different variables, such as the weathering processes of evaporation, dispersion, photo-oxidation, and biodegradation—all of which reduce the amount of oil in the water over time. Currents and winds also play a role in determining where oil will move in water. For example, there are three major currents that would dominate movement of spilled oil near the Florida Straits : Loop Current, Florida Current, and the Gulf Stream. If oil did reach U.S. waters, //marine and coastal resources// in southern Florida could be //at risk//, including //coral reefs// and the Florida Keys //National Marine Sanctuary// , located north of the Cuban drilling sites. We'll be watching the drilling activity there very carefully. If a spill does happen, NOAA will be ready to share our scientific expertise on oil spill response with the U.S. Coast Guard.

Padgett 12 (Tim, “The Oil Off Cuba: Washington and Havana Dance at Arms Length Over Spill Prevention”, 1/27, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2105598,00.html)

On any other occasion that might have raised the ire of the Cubans, who consider Washington their imperialista enemy. But the U.S. examination of the Scarabeo 9, which Repsol agreed to and Cuba abided, was part of an unusual choreography of cooperation between the two countries. Their otherwise bitter cold-war feud (they haven't had diplomatic relations since 1961) is best known for a 50-year-long trade embargo and history's scariest nuclear standoff. Now, Cuba's commitment to offshore oil exploration — drilling may start this weekend — raises a specter that haunts both nations : an //oil spill in the Florida Straits// like the BP calamity that tarred the nearby Gulf of Mexico two years ago and left $40 billion in U.S. damages. The Straits, an equally vital body of water that's home to some of the world's most //precious coral reefs//, separates Havana and Key West, Florida, by a //mere 90 miles//. As a result, the U.S. has tacitly loosened its embargo against Cuba to give firms like Repsol easier access to the U.S. equipment they need to help avoid or contain possible spills. "Preventing drilling off Cuba better protects our interests than preparing for [a disaster] does," U.S. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida tells TIME, noting the U.S. would prefer to stop the Cuban drilling — but can't. "But the two are not mutually exclusive, and that's why we should aim to do both."

Helman 11 (Christopher – Forbes, “U.S. Should Drop Cuba Embargo For Oil Exploration”, 12/12, http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/12/12/u-s-should-drop-cuba-embargo-for-oil-exploration/)

In a few months Spanish oil company Repsol will start drilling for oil off the coast of Cuba, in a spot just 70 miles south of Key West. Soon Repsol–and its JV partners Norway’s Statoil and India’s ONGC–will be joined by rigs from PetroVietnam, Malaysia’s Petronas and Venezuela’s PDVSA. But you won’t see any U.S. companies there. Inexplicably, the U.S. maintains its economic embargo against the Castro regime. This wrong -headed policyrepresents a //dangerous threat to the environment//and a //huge missed opportunity// to the U.S. oil industr y.The U.S. embargo will do nothing to prevent oil drilling from taking place in Cuban waters. But it will prevent that work from being done by the most experienced companies with the highest-quality equipment. Norway’s Statoil is a proven operator with a long history in the North Sea and the Gulf. The rest of those companies are just getting started offshore. A group of U.S. lawmakers in September urged Repsol (ticker: REPYY.PK) to call off its Cuba plans or face the threat of U.S. lawsuits. Repsol wisely called that bluff. At least the Obama administration is doing something to ensure that Repsol’s drilling rig is up to snuff. According to an excellent article from Bloomberg today, Repsol’s Chinese-built Scarabeo 9 rig will soon by boarded by four U.S. inspectors (two from the Coast Guard, two from the Dept. of Interior) who will do what they can to check out the rig and watch some drills. But, according to the article, there will be real limits to what the inspectors can inspect. They won’t get to check the rig’s all-important blowout preventor, or the well casing or drilling fluids that are to be used. Though the U.S. inspectors will discuss any concerns they have with Repsol, they will have no enforcement authority. Although the offshore industry’s best service companies and parts manufacturers are right here on the U.S. Gulf coast, Repsol will have to train its people and scrounge for spare parts from the rest of the world. But here’s something that completely blows my mind. The administration, again, according to the Bloomberg article, has granted some U.S. companies the license to respond to an oil spill were it to occur in Cuban waters. The government won’t say how many companies have that license or who they are, but there’s at least two of them: Wild Well Control and Helix Energy Solutions Group. Helix plans to stage a subsea containment cap on the U.S. coast so it can quickly respond to any Cuban blowout. Of course it’s smart and safe for the U.S. government to put defensive measures in place in the event of a spill, but the message to the industry is clear : //we refuse to give superior U.S. operators the license to drill for oil in Cuba//, but we want to make sure you’re ready to clean up any problems. And the message to Cuba : we’re not going to let you use our engineers, just our janitors. Knowing that a top-notch American clean-up crew is on standby in case of a blowout is not a big incentive for Cuba to keep its own regulators on top of things. Think about Cuba in relation to U.S. oil adventures in the rest of the world. Even if Cuba really were a tyrannical threat to U.S. interests,there’s myriad countries where U.S. oil companies have done business that are no more democratic than Cuba. They include Venezuela, Saudi Arabia , Burma, Libya , Equatorial Guinea and Kazakhstan. The Castros’ days as rulers of Cuba are numbered. The embargo stick hasn’t brought regime change, and hasonly forced Cuba into the arms of autocrats like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Better to use the carrot of capitalism to gradually bring Cuba into //the U.S. sphere of influence//. The oil industry is a great place to start.

Jayawardena 9 (Asitha, London South Bank University, “We Are a Threat to All Life on Earth”, Indicator, 7-17, http://www.indicator.org.uk/?p=55)

Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) explain in detail why the natural environment is so important for life on Earth. It is from the environment that the living organisms of all species import the energy and raw material required for growth, development and reproduction. In almost all ecosystems plants, the most important primary producers, carry out photosynethesis, capturing sunlight and storing it as chemical energy. They absorb nutrients from their environment. When herbivores (i.e. plant-eating animals or organisms) eat these plants possessing chemical energy, matter and energy are transferred ‘one-level up.’ The same happens when predators (i.e. animals of a higher level) eat these herbivores or when predators of even higher levels eat these predators. Therefore, in ecosystems, food webs transfer energy and matter and various organisms play different roles in sustaining these transfers. Such transfers are possible due to the remarkable similarity in all organisms’ composition and major metabolic pathways. In fact all organisms except plants can potentially use each other as energy and nutrient sources; plants, however, depend on sunlight for energy. Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) further reveal two key principles governing the biosphere with respect to the transfer of energy and matter in ecosystems. Firstly, the energy flow in ecosystems from photosynthetic plants (generally speaking, autotrophs) to non-photosynthetic organisms (generally speaking, heterotrophs) is essentially linear. In each step part of energy is lost to the ecosystem as non-usable heat, limiting the number of transformation steps and thereby the number of levels in a food web. Secondly, unlike the energy flow, the matter flow in ecosystems is cyclic. For photosynthesis plants need carbon dioxide as well as minerals and sunlight. For the regeneration of carbon dioxide plants, the primary producers, depend on heterotrophs, who exhale carbon dioxide when breathing. Like carbon, many other elements such as nitrogen and sulphur flow in cyclic manner in ecosystems. However, it is photosynthesis, and in the final analysis, solar energy that powers the mineral cycles. Ecosystems are under threat and so are we Although it seems that a continued energy supply from the sun together with the cyclical flow of matter can maintain the biosphere machinery running forever, we should not take things for granted, warn Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995). And they explain why. Since the beginning of life on Earth some 3.5 billion years ago, organisms have evolved and continue to do so today in response to environmental changes. However, the overall picture of materials (re)cycling and linear energy transfer has always remained unchanged. We could therefore safely assume that this slowly evolving system will continue to exist for aeons to come if large scale infringements are not forced upon it, conclude Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995). However, according to them, the present day infringements are large enough to upset the world’s ecosystems and, worse still, human activity is mainly responsible for these infringements. The rapidity of the human-induced changes is particularly undesirable. For example, the development of modern technology has taken place in a very short period of time when compared with evolutionary time scales – within decades or centuries rather than thousands or millions of years. Their observations and concerns are shared by a number of other scholars. Roling (2009) warns that human activity is capable of making the collapse of web of life on which both humans and non-human life forms depend for their //existence.// For Laszlo (1989: 34), in Maiteny and Parker (2002), modern human is ‘a serious threat //to the future of humankind’//. As Raven (2002) observes, many life-support systems are deteriorating rapidly and visibly. Elaborating on human-induced large scale infringements, Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) warn that they can significantly alter the current patterns of energy transfer and materials recycling , posing //grave problems to the entire biosphere//. And climate change is just one of them! Turning to a key source of this crisis, Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995: 37) emphasise that, although we humans can mentally afford to step outside the biosphere, we are ‘animals among animals, organisms among organisms.’ Their perception on the place of humans in nature is resonated by several other scholars. For example, Maiteny (1999) stresses that we humans are part and parcel of the ecosphere. Hartmann (2001) observes that the modern stories (myths, beliefs and paradigms) that humans are not an integral part of nature but are separate from it are speeding our own demise. Funtowicz and Ravetz (2002), in Weaver and Jansen (2004: 7), criticise modern science’s model of human-nature relationship based on conquest and control of nature, and highlight a more desirable alternative of ‘respecting ecological limits, …. expecting surprises and adapting to these.’

Kunich 1 (John C., Assoc. Prof Law – Roger Williams University School of Law, 52 Hastings L.J. 1149, Lexis)

It is rather well known, even beyond the scientific community, that many of the world's species have either gone extinct or are on the road to extinction. It is much less well known, but equally important, that __enormous numbers of these species are confined to a few "//hotspots//" of biodiversity__, far beyond the norm for the average region of comparable size. These hotspots are the key to the //future of life on this planet//. To understand why, we must first examine the degree of risk to which earth's biodiversity is exposed today.

Tisdall 3/5 ( Simon Tisdall, writer for the Guardian, March 5th, 2013, "Death of Hugo Chávez brings chance of fresh start for US and Latin America" [|www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/05/hugo-chavez-dead-us-latin-america/print])

Hugo **__Chávez's departure furnishes Barack Obama with an //opportunity to repair US ties// //with Venezuela//, but also with //other Latin American states// whose relations with Washington were adversely affected by Chávez's politics of polarisation and the Bush administration's viscerally unintelligent reaction__**. ¶ In particular, **__the change of leadership in Caracas could__** __//unlock the deadlock over Cuba//__, if the White House can summon the requisite political will. ¶ Possibly anticipating a transition, __Washington quietly engineered a diplomatic opening with Caracas last November after a lengthy standoff during which ambassadors were withdrawn__. ¶ Roberta Jacobson, assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, telephoned Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela's vice-president and Chávez's preferred successor, __and discussed, among other things, the restoration of full diplomatic relations__. ¶ "According to US officials, the Venezuelan vice-president offered to exchange ambassadors on the occasion of the beginning of President Barack Obama's second term. Jacobson, in turn, is said to have proposed a step-by-step approach to improve bilateral relations, starting with greater co-operation in counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and energy issues," Andres Oppenheimer reported in the Miami Herald. ¶ There is much ground to make up. "Relations between the United States and Venezuela have ranged from difficult to hostile since Chávez took office in 1999 and began to implement what he calls 21st-century socialism," wrote a former US ambassador to Caracas, Charles Shapiro. ¶ "Chávez blamed a failed 2002 coup against him on the United States (not true), nationalised US companies, insulted the president of the United States and blamed 'the empire' – his term for the United States – for every ill … In foreign affairs, the government actively supports the Assad regime in Syria, rejects sanctions on Iran and generally opposes the US at every turn." ¶ Despite such strains, economic self-interest always prevented a complete rupture. The US remained Venezuela's most important trading partner throughout Chávez's presidency, buying nearly half its oil exports. Caracas is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the US. ¶ In fact, the US imports more crude oil annually from Mexico and Venezuela than from the entire Persian Gulf. This shared commerce now provides a formidable incentive and a launch platform for a fresh start. ¶ Whether the opportunity is grasped depends partly on Maduro, a Chávez loyalist but a reputed pragmatist with close ties to Raúl Castro in Cuba. ¶ Yet **__it depends even more on Obama, whose first term, after a promising start, ended up perpetuating Washington's historical neglect of Latin America__**__. **He now has a chance to do better**.__ ¶ **__The political climate seems propitious.__** __Economic and cultural ties are also strengthening dramatically. Trade between the US and Latin America grew by 82% between 1998 and 2009.__ In 2011 alone, exports and imports rose by a massive 20% in both directions. ¶ "We do three times more business with Latin America than with China and twice as much business with Colombia [as] with Russia," an Obama official told Julia Sweig of the US Council on Foreign Relations. Latinos now comprise 15% of the US population; the US is the world's second largest Spanish-speaking country (after Mexico). ¶ Despite this convergence, high-level US strategic thinking about the region has continued to lag, Sweig argued. ¶ "For the last two decades, US domestic politics have too often driven Washington's Latin America agenda – whether on issues of trade, immigration, drugs, guns or that perennial political albatross, Cuba, long driven by the supposedly crucial 'Cuban vote' in Florida," she said. ¶ __Obama could change this dynamic if he tried and **one way to do it would be to unpick //the Cuban problem//, which continues to //colour the way Latin Americans view Washington//**.__ ¶ __"Having won nearly half of the Cuban American vote in Florida in 2012, a gain of 15 percentage points over 2008, Obama can move quickly on Cuba. If he were to do so, he would find a cautious but willing partner in Raúl //Castro, who needs rapprochement with Washington to advance his own reform agenda//,"__ Sweig said.

Pascual and Huddleston 9 (Carlos – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy – the Brookings Institution, and Vicki – Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, April, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)

U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people and //strengthen U.S. credibility//throughout the hemisphere. Our nearly 50-year old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has resulted //in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the island//and has left the U nited S tates isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy has become //a bellwether//, indicating the extent to which the U nited S tates will act in partnership with the region or unilaterally—and ineffectually. i nevitably, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary if the United States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This paper proposes a new goal for U.S. policy to - ward Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the polit - ical and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed ; it must come from within ; the type of government at the helm of the island’s future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore encompass the political, //economic//, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the U nited S tates in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that pro - mote the well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban gov - ernment and Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other govern - ments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). i n so doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect the hemisphere’s and our own desire to encourage the Cuban govern - ment to adopt international standards of democ - racy, human rights, and transparency. Engagement does not mean approval of the Cu - ban government’s policies, nor should it indicate a wish to control internal developments in Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans. i f the United States is to play a positive role in Cuba’s future, it must not indulge in hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue on issues that would advance democracy, justice, and human rights as well as our broader national interests. p erversely, the policy of seeking to iso - late Cuba, rather than achieving its objective, has contributed to undermining the well-being of the Cuban people and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and l atin America. i t has reinforced the Cuban government’s power over its citizens by in - creasing their dependence on it for every aspect of their livelihood. By slowing the flow of ideas and information, we have unwittingly helped Cuban state security delay Cuba’s political and economic evolution toward a more open and representa - tive government. And, by too tightly embracing Cuba’s brave dissidents, we have provided the Cu - ban authorities with an excuse to denounce their legitimate efforts to build a more open society. The Cuban r evolution of 1959 is a fact of histo - ry that cannot be removed or unlived, but, over time, Cuba will change. As the Cuban people become inexorably linked to the region and the world, they will themselves come to play a larger role in the way they are governed. Mortality and time—not U.S. sanctions—have already begun the process of change. A new generation of Cu - ban leaders will replace the Castro brothers and those who fought in the Sierra Maestra. Although Cuba is already undergoing a process of change, the Bush administration’s decision to cling to out - moded tactics of harsh rhetoric and confrontation alienated leaders across the region. Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the Obama administration because it offers a unique opportunity for the president to transform our rela - tions with the hemisphere. Even a slight shift away from hostility to engagement will permit the United States to work more closely with the region to ef - fectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba. By announcing a policy of critical and constructive engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the president can prove that he has been listening to the region. He can under - line this commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging in dialogue with the regime, as prom - ised during his campaign. By reciprocally improv - ing our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will en - hance our understanding of the island, its people, and its leaders. However, while these measures will promote understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relation - ship between our countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal dip - lomatic relations over time. i f the president is to advance U.S. interests and principles, he will need a new policy and a long- term strategic vision for U.S. relations with Cuba. i f he is prepared to discard the failed policy of regime change and adopt one of critical and con - structive engagement, he and his administration will lay the foundations for a new approach to - ward Cuba and the l atin America. l ike his pre - decessors, p resident Obama has the authority to //substantially modify embargo regulations//in order to advance a policy of engagement that would broaden and deepen contacts with the Cuban people and their government. He has the popular support — domestic and international—to engage Cuba, and , by so doing, to //staunch our diminishing influence// on the island and recapture the high road in our //relations with the hemisphere.//

Grogg 12 (Patricia – IPS, Citing Luiz Rene Fernandez – Senior Research and Professor at University of Havana specializing in international economics, “CUBA: Oil Drilling Opens Up New Possibilities”, 2/16, http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/02/cuba-oil-drilling-opens-up-new-possibilities/)

The search for oil in Cuba’s Gulf of Mexico waters, launched by the Spanish firm Repsol, has triggered speculation about future prospects for Cuba and the possibility of this country one day making the transition from importer to exporter of crude. Moreover, given its strategic importancefor both the U nited S tates and Cuba, some analysts believe that //energy offers a potential area for cooperation// that could eventually help //pave the way to the normalisation of relations// between the two countries. For the moment, the Cuban authorities and oil industry personnel are remaining discreetly silent on the subject. CUPET, the state-owned oil company, has limited itself to officially confirming the arrival in the country on Jan. 19 of the Scarabeo 9 oil rig for “the resumption in the coming days of deepwater drilling for oil exploration.” Drilling operations presumably began in late January. According to CUPET, the goal is to continue testing to determine the potential for oil and gas production in Cuba’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Gulf of Mexico. The results of the drilling will contribute to defining that potential. After opening up its economy to foreign investment in 1991, Cuba divided the EEZ, which covers an area of 112,000 sq km, into 59 oil and gas exploration blocks. On Jan. 18, Rafael Tenreiro, director of exploration and production at CUPET, reiterated a previous estimate of a potential 20,000 million barrels in the area. At the launching of the book “Perforación de pozos petroleros marinos” (“Offshore Oil Well Drilling”) by Rolando Fernández, supervisor of the Gulf of Mexico operations group, Tenreiro stated that it was “possible” that Cuba could become an oil exporter. “We have to prepare the country for this good news,” he added, stressing the need for the production of technology and participation in the entire process. In 2011, more than 20 offshore exploration blocks had already been leased to large foreign energy companies, including, in addition to Repsol, StatoilHydro of Norway, ONGC Videsh of India, PETRONAS of Malaysia, PetroVietnam, Gazprom of Russia, Sonangol of Angola the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. Reflecting on the potential ramifications should Repsol’s exploratory drilling prove successful, university professor Fernando Martirena told IPS that large-scale development of the Cuban oil industry would obviously provide a boost to the government programmes currently underway, since it would represent “a needed injection of fresh foreign currency into a tense national economy.” This scenario, “combined with the package of measures being implemented as a result of the ‘updating’ of the Cuban economic model, will heat up the issue of the blockade,” said Martirena. Under the U.S. economic embargo against this Caribbean island nation, in place for 50 years this month, U.S. companies are shut out from profiting from a potential oil boom in Cuba. In Martirena’s view, if the U.S. Congress wants to be pragmatic, “it will have to choose between continuing to support the hysterical Cuban-American bloc that does so much lobbying around the issue of the blockade, or simply accepting reality – that there is no reason to maintain this policy .” Cuban-American members of Congress headed up by the chairwoman of the influential House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, have attempted to block Repsol’s drilling operations in Cuban waters. While they claim that their opposition is based on concerns for the environment and the security of the United States, analysts believe that their motivation is primarily political. Before arriving in Cuban waters, the Scarabeo 9 drilling rig – built in China and assembled in Singapore, and therefore exempt from the prohibitions of the U.S. embargo – successfully passed inspection by personnel from the U.S. Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement and the U.S. Coast Guard. CUPET has also vouched that the cutting-edge equipment leased by Repsol for its drilling operations has been duly verified to include the necessary features to guarantee the utmost efficiency and safety. The exploratory drilling is expected to last roughly two and a half months. “Technically speaking, the chances of a mishap occurring in Cuba’s economic area are extremely small, not only because of the precautions taken, but also for purely statistical reasons. This is one drilling rig out of the countless rigs operating outside of Cuban waters” in the Gulf of Mexico, economist Luis René Fernández commented to IPS. An expert on Cuba-U.S. relations, Fernández noted that while there are political risks associated with the issues of security and environmental impacts, there are also experiences that indicate that these “could and should be reduced.” “(Socialist) Venezuela has not stopped supplying oil to the United States, although it has tried to diversity its markets,” he mentioned as an example. He also pointed to the migration accords signed by Havana and Washington and Cuba’s purchases of food from U.S. companies despite “all of the restrictions and limitations.” “In these cases, among the reasons for a certain type of communication and collaboration, it always boils down to the importance of geography. There are common issues in which it is more beneficial for both sides to address them directly and even to cooperate. Not doing so could have high costs, not only economic, but also for the environment and security,” he said. Fernández stressed that the U.S. government is not a “unified actor” and that there are different agencies that deal with matters such as energy and the environment. “ There are experts and professionals who fulfil their missions and could have real impacts on the concrete political situation, ” he said, due to geographical proximity but also because “ it is advisable to cooperate in spite of political and ideological differences .” In his opinion, both countries are moving in the mid term and especially in the long term towards the normalisation of relations, regardless of the particular political circumstances in the United States. “ On the Cuban side, there is a well-known willingness to cooperate and even to debate, on respectful and equal terms, all of the aspects of the bilateral conflict,” he stressed. “ This could be another important area for cooperation, //precisely because of the strategic significance of energy// sources for both the U nited S tates and Cuba. Are there risks? Without a doubt. But the benefits of cooperation definitely outweigh them,” Fernández concluded.

Boston Globe 2/9 (“Cuba’s reforms pave way for new US policy, too”, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/02/09/cuba-reform-create-opportunity-drag-policy-into-century/xER2NTTXGsxdLej0miHwFM/story.html)

Relations between the U nited S tates and Cuba have been stuck since the U nited S tates imposed a full economic embargo in 1962, and during the election season neither President Obama nor Mitt Romney signaled much desire to change the status quo. Yet while Americans have been looking elsewhere, significant change has come to Cuba. The communist government of the ruling Castro brothers, Fidel and Raul, is in the midst of a slow experiment //to promote economic entrepreneurship//. Late last year, Cuba instituted reforms to its immigration policies that allow Cubans to travel abroad freely and allow those who have emigrated or fled to return home. These changes, and the beginning of Obama’s second term , //create an unusual opportunity//to acknowledge Cuba’s gestures and respond in a substantive way. Rather than simply extend policies that, in five decades, have failed to dislodge the Castros, the Obama administration has a chance to drag US policy into the 21st century. The Cuban-American population, which has historically opposed any loosening of US policy, is no longer monolithic. Supporting greater contact with friends, family, and the Cuban economy now animates a younger generation of Florida voters. Because of this trend, Obama — who performed nearly as well with Cuban-American voters as Romney — has more maneuvering room politically. The first step would be to end the silly claim, reinstated by the Obama administration last summer, that Cuba remains a “state sponsor of terrorism.” The administration argued that Cuba harbored members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. It has, but the FARC and Colombia are now in negotiations; those peace talks are supported by the Obama White House in order to end a bloody civil war. By depoliticizing the Cuba portfolio, the U nited S tates could then begin to lessen trade restrictions, starting with promoting cultural exchanges; ending the travel ban; and eventually allow ing for trade in oil, gas, and other commodities. Over time, billions of dollars in new trade between the two nations will benefit both. This would include boosts to US farm companies while helping Cubans. Direct relations would also further US national security and environmental interests ;as Cuba opens up, other countries will sweep in to seek influence, as China has already done. Especially as Cuba //increasingly promotes offshore drilling// and other maritime exploration, the U nited S tates //must improve communication// with Havana. Currently, even though the United States and Cuba are separated by a narrow channel, the two countries have no bilateral communications to ensure safety standards for their mutual protection from oil spills. Secretary of State John Kerry should make Cuba a focus of his first months in office. Unfortunately, his successor as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is Robert Menendez of New Jersey, a son of Cuban immigrants who has opposed the administration’s efforts to ease relations. Menendez will need to be convinced that he can help Cubans more by resetting American policy. Absent military intervention, there are very few opportunities for a president to dramatically alter relations with a historic foe; Obama has taken such advantage of a disorientingly rapid liberalization by Burma’s military rulers. Raul Castro’s recent decision to lift travel restrictions on Cuban citizens is similarly momentous — and signals that //the timing is ripe// for a new diplomatic agenda with Cuba.

Benjamin-Alvadaro 6 (Jonathan, Report for the Cuban Research Institute, Florida International University, PhD, Professor of Political Science at University of Nebraska at Omaha, Director of the Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence Program at UNO, Treasurer of the American Political Science Association, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special,” http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/oil-cuba-alvarado.pdf)

Given that there are no formal diplomatic of economic relations between the governments of the //U// nited //S// tates and Cuba, the level of interest has grown significantly in the 3 years due primarily to three reasons in the following interest areas: energy security interests; broader regional strategic; and purely economic interests. First, the energy security interests in the potential of Cuban oil – although it really would not minimize the immediacy of an American energy crisis – is seen as possible if only partial remedy to energy supply concerns. Second, as Cuba, in part because of the increasing number of oil partnerships furthers its diplomatic and economic ties to with countries like Venezuela, China, Brazil and members of the European Union it may prove to provide Cuba for a sufficient buffer against U.S. opposition as it solidifies it economic and diplomatic role in the region. This is important inasmuch as there is a de facto trend in the Americas that clearly disavows and attempts to //minimize the influence of the United States// in the region, and with the growing demands on the world economy by China, it stands to reason that Cuba may assume an increasing stature that almost potentially //lessens the presence of American influence in Cuban and hence regional affairs//. Finally, and as demonstrated by the presence of American oil interests in the February 2006 U.S.- Cuban Energy Summit in Mexico City, there may be interest in cooperating in joint venture projects, and by extension assisting in the long-term development in Cuba’s oil industry. ¶ To accomplish this task the report seeks to lay out some national security policy considerations applying strategic thought to what I will term “Post-Oil” Cuba – a Cuba that has a small but vibrant and growing oil and gas production capacity with extensive relations with a number of partners, and an increasingly positive outlook toward addressing energy and economic development questions that have plagued the Castro regime since the Cuban Revolution.3 ¶ The primary consideration is to determine the present state of Cuban energy and what possibilities exist that would be available to American foreign policy decision makers and business interests as the relations with Cuba evolve over the coming years.4 This is important because //any realistic appraisal of how Cuba is to take advantage of its oil bonanza involves the United States.// Previous research in this area has clearly laid out the scope and objectives of Cuban energy development schemes in the period since the demise of Cuba’s favorable trade arrangements with the former Soviet Union. Recently, and as a result of the oil discovery and Cuba’s energy arrangement with the government of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela there is renewed interest in Havana’s energy policies. Most of that analysis has been focused on concrete possibilities where there can be cooperation in the energy field between these two neighbors. Specifically, the work has looked at areas for the convergence of energy interests as they apply to the near- and long-term energy development scenarios facing both countries. Myers Jaffe and Soligo have addressed this possibility by looking at the potential to increase diversification and dispersion of energy resources. This is an important consideration when one takes into consideration that well over one-third of all oil refining capacity resides on or near the Houston shipping channel. The potential negative impact on America’s refining capacity following Hurricane Rita5 made a significant impression on oil industry analysts for the necessity of diversifying the location of these vital national resources. The potential of viewing Cuba as a “staging area” for American oil storage and refining is plausible because of the proximity of the island. The also becomes more attractive because of the growing climatic concerns over the uncertain security of oil resources in the Gulf region as clearly demonstrated by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. While it is true that Venezuela has initiated an investment of $1 billion dollars to bring the Cienfuegos refinery online, there are still many other possibilities open and available to American companies, as well as a growing number of foreign firms .6 Additionally, Venezuela remains the fourth largest importer of oil to the United States and one can surmise that the existing trade arrangements between the U.S. and Venezuela will remain intact, the evolution of the Bolivarian revolution under Chavez and a growing Chinese presence in the region notwithstanding. Additionally, pursuing such a path would allow U nited S tates policymakers to take advantage of what Cuba has to offer in the following areas: //domestic technical capabilities// ; continuing human capital development; //strategic positioning in the Caribbean, and an improved diplomatic stature.// Cuba, by any measure, possesses a largely untapped technical capacity owing to advanced training and education in the core mathematic and scientific areas. This was clearly demonstrated by its attempt to develop a nuclear energy capability in the 1980s and 1990s whereby thousands of Cubans pursued highly technical career paths leaving Cuba with //among the highest ratios of scientists and engineers to the general population in all of the Americas.// Moreover, the foundation of Cuba’s vaunted public education system remains intact and increased investment under various scenarios suggests that Cuba will continue to produce a welleducated workforce that will be critical to its future economic vitality. This raises an important consideration that being the role that Cuba will play in the region in the 21st century. It suffices to say that Cuba remains the //strategically important state// by virtue of its geographical location alone, in efforts against drug and human trafficking and related national and regional security matters. The extent to which a stable Cuban government has cooperated with the U.S. in drug interdiction efforts in the past suggests that the results from improved diplomatic relations between neighbors would have the effect of improv ing national security concerns relatedto //terrorist activity, illicit weapons transfers// and the like. Ultimately, //a successful normalization of relations// between the U.S. and Cuba in these areas //may well enhance and stabilize regional relations that could possibly lessen// (or at a minimum, balancing) //fears of a Chinese incursion in hemispheric affairs.// To lessen those fears it may be useful to review the present structure of joint-venture projects in the energy sector in Cuba to ascertain the feasibility and possible success of such an undertaking become available to American firms. Moreover, it is interesting to note that U.S. firms in the agriculture sector have successfully negotiated and consummated sales to Cuba totaling more than $1 billion dollars over the past four years under conditions that are less than optimal circumstances but have well-served the commercial interests of all parties involved.

Luko 11 (James – Served in Washington DC with the National Council For Soviet East European Research, the Smithsonian Institute and two years as an analyst with the Canadian Department of National Defence, “China's Moves on Cuba Need to Be Stopped”, 6/29, http://www.nolanchart.com/article8774-chinas-moves-on-cuba-need-to-be-stopped.html)

The Red Dragon takes another wide step of not only flexing its muscles in Asia, but now wishes to supplant Russias and (former USSRs) forward base presence 90 miles from the United States- CUBA. //Cuba is China's biggest trade partner//in the Caribbean region, while China is Cuba's second-largest trade partner after Venezuela. Over the past decade, bilateral trade increased from $440 million in 2001 to $1.83 billion in 2010. [1] In 2006 China and Cuba discussed //offshore oil deals// and now China's National Petroleum Corporation is a major player in Cuban infrastructure improvements. [ibid] In 2008, none other than China's President himself, Hu JinTao visited Cuba with a sweet package of loans, grants and trade deals. If Cuba becomes a 'client' state of China, //it will be a source of leverage against America//whenever the U.S. Pressures China on Tibet and //Taiwan.// Soon we will witness the newly constructed blue-water navy of China cruising Cuba's coast in protection of their trade routes and supply of natural resources. In 2003 it was reported that Chinese personnel were operating at least TWO (2) intelligence signal sations in Cuba since at least 1999 ! [2] This month, June 2011, the Vice President of China made an important visit, extending more financial aid, interest-free, as well as related health projects to be paid for by China. A client state in the making ! [3] The best way to counter the Chinese in Cuba is to reverseAmericas 50 year old, ineffective and obsolete policy of isolationism and boycott of Cuba. The Chinese threat in Cuba should be the catalyst for the US to establish open and normalized relation s, with economic incentives to re-Americanize Cuba, return of American investments and security agreements. Checking the Chinese move in Cuba early on is vital to preventing a strategic Chinese foothold 90 miles from Florida. Allowing China to replace Russia in Cuba would //be a strategic disaster//. China is dangling financial assistance and investments in order to establish a beachhead close to the shores of America. This is a counter-response to Americas continued military presence in Asia, continued //support of Taiwan// and recent increased American aid to the Philippines in its spat with China over sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. The Cuban people wish to return to the American fold and re-establish the traditional relationship with the Cuban anchor in Florida- namely the almost 900,000 Cubans living in Florida alone! [4]

scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

Fergusson 12 (Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International Business Times, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of Glasgow, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests/)

Taiwan – domestic, or foreign policy? ¶ China’s goals in the region amount to more than the capture of natural resources. Although the People’s Republic of China considers resolution of the Taiwan issue to be a domestic issue, it is with some irony that one of China’s main foreign policy goals is to //isolate Taipei internationally//. The PRC and the ROC compete directly for international recognition among all the states in the world. . Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where //12 of the 23 nations// that still have official diplomatic relations with the ROC reside. ¶ The historical background ¶ Following the mainland Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the nationalist Kuomintang retreated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) where it continued to claim to be the legitimate government of all of China. In June 1950 the United States intervened by placing its 7th fleet in the Taiwan straits to stop a conclusive military resolution to the civil war and slowly the battlefield became primarily political, concerned with legitimacy. ¶ When the United Nations was formed in 1945, the Republic of China (ROC) became one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This gave the ROC a de facto advantage over the PRC in attaining recognition from other nation states; particularly as the diplomatic clout of the hegemonic United States supported its position as the true representative of the Chinese people, until the rapprochement of the 1970s, when the Nixon administration wished to improve ties with the de facto rulers of China in order to exploit the Sino-Soviet split. UN Resolution 2758 granted the ’China seat’ to the PRC at the expense of the ROC who were in effect exiled from the organization, and the famous 1972 visit of President Nixon to China further added legitimacy to the communist regime. All this resulted in a thawing of world opinion, and gradually as the durability and permanence of the PRC regime became ingrained, countries began switching their diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. ¶ The economics of international recognition ¶ In the Americas, the PRC had international recognition and longstanding support from ideological allies such as Cuba. However, the ROC has maintained more diplomatic support in the Americas than any other region, mainly due to the small nature of the states involved and the importance of Taiwanese aid to their economies. Li notes that “from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, roughly 10 percent of Taiwan’s direct foreign investment (FDI) went to Latin America and the Caribbean,” [51] highlighting the concerted effort made in the region. Economic solidarity is increasingly important to the formation of the Taiwan-Latin America relationship, for two reasons. The first is that for Latin American states, the decision of which China to support is less ideological and political than it ever has been; which makes the decision a straight up economic zero-sum choice. The second is that Latin America is home to natural resources which are of great significance to the hungry growing economies of the PRC and the ROC regardless of international recognition. ¶ However, while the decision is not political for Latin American countries, for Taiwan, every country which switches its recognition to the PRC damages its legitimacy as a nation state in the international arena. The Table below shows the designation of diplomatic recognition in the region in 2008. ¶ Countries Recognising the PRC (China)Countries Recognising the ROC (Taiwan)Central AmericaMexico, Costa RicaEl Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, PanamaCaribbeanAntigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname, Trinidad & TobagoBelize, Dominican Republic, Haiti, St Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the GrenadinesSouth AmericaArgentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, VenezuelaParaguay ¶ On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the ‘//Taiwan issue’ unilaterally//. Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to ‘outbidding’ Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that “the region’s leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other.” [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007. ¶ However, even Taiwan‘s economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for example, the Dominican case. ¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54] ¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America. ¶ Political strategies of the PRC ¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China “provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan,” [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC ; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC “has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan),” [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, China’s experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 “the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,” [58] further isolating the ROC. ¶ The effect on American interests ¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the US A would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, //perhaps by force//.

Mazza 1/3 (Michael Mazza 1-3, research fellow in foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute, 1/3/13, “Four Surprises That Could Rock Asia in 2013,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/03/four_surprises_that_could_rock_asia_in_2012?page=full)

Since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, Taipei and Beijing have improved ties and deepened their economic integration: cross-strait trade reached $127.6 billion in 2011, an increase of more than 13 percent from 2010. //Some national security experts misinterpret this trend//, thinking that growing economic interdependence will overwhelm factors pushing the two sides apart , and that interdependence will provide Beijing with leverage it can use to compel unification. But while Taiwan's businesspeople enjoy closer ties with China, the average//Taiwanese voter continues to move toward independence//. Over the last 20 years, the portion of citizens of Taiwan identifying as "Taiwanese" has increased from 17.6 percent of those polled in 1992 to a whopping 53.7 percent today; those identifying as "Chinese" has declined over the same period from 25.5 percent to just 3.1 percent today. Support for independence has nearly doubled over the last two decades, from 11.1 percent to 19.6 percent. Support for immediate or eventual unification, meanwhile, has more than halved, from 20 percent in 1992 to 9.8 percent in 2012. ¶ Economic integration is apparently //failing to halt what Beijing sees as a troubling trend//. With a cross-strait trade agreement and a slew of other, easier deals already on the books, Beijing now expects Ma to discuss political issues. But Ma doesn't have the domestic political support to pursue political talks -- in March 2012, two months after his reelection, 45 percent of those polled said the pace of cross-strait exchanges was "just right," but the share of respondents answering "too fast" had increased to 32.6 percent, from 25.7 percent before the election. //Any Chinese shift//toward a more strident Taiwan policy could//portend a new crisis// in the Taiwan Strait //sooner than many expect//, as a lack of progress on these issues may//buttress hawks// in the new Xi Jinping administration. And //America would surely be dragged in// : Even low-level coercive measures against Taiwan -- a top 10 U.S. trading partner and security ally -- could//throw U.S.-China relations into a tailspin//.

Lowther 3/16 (William Lowther 3-16, Taipei Times, citing a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3/16/13, “Taiwan could spark nuclear war: report,” [])

Taiwan is the//most likely potential crisis//that could//trigger a nuclear war// between China and the US, a new academic report concludes. ¶ “Taiwan remains the single most plausible and dangerous source of tension and conflict between the US and China,” says the 42-page report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). ¶ Prepared by the CSIS’ Project on Nuclear Issues and resulting from a year-long study, the report emphasizes that Beijing continues to beset on a policy to prevent Taiwan’s independence ,while at the same time the US maintains the capability to come to Taiwan’s defense. ¶ “Although tensions across the Taiwan Strait have subsided since both Taipei and Beijing embraced a policy of engagement in 2008, //the situation remains combustible//, complicated by//rapidly diverging cross-strait military capabilities// and persistent political disagreements ,” the report says. ¶ In a footnote, it quotes senior fellow at the US Council on Foreign Relations Richard Betts describing Taiwan as “the main potential flashpoint for the US in East Asia.” ¶ The report also quotes Betts as saying that neither Beijing nor Washington can fully control developments that might ignite a Taiwan crisis. ¶ “ This is a classic recipe for surprise, //miscalculation and uncontrolled escalation// ,” Betts wrote in a separate study of his own. ¶ The CSIS study says: “For the foreseeable future Taiwan is the contingency in which nuclear weapons would most likely become a major factor, because the fate of the island is intertwined both with the legitimacy of the C hinese C ommunist P arty and the reliability of US defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region.” ¶ Titled Nuclear Weapons and US-China Relations, the study says disputes in the East and South China seas appear unlikely to lead to major conflict between China and the US, but they do “provide kindling” for potential conflict between the two nations because the disputes implicate a number of important regional interests, including the interests of treaty allies of the US. ¶ The danger posed by flashpoints such as Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and maritime demarcation disputes is magnified by the potential for mistakes, the study says. ¶ “ Although Beijing and Washington have agreed to a range of crisis management mechanisms, such as the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the establishment of a direct hotline between the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense, //the bases for miscommunication and misunderstanding remain//and draw on//deep historical reservoirs of suspicion// ,” the report says. ¶ For example, it says, it is unclear whether either side understands what kinds of actions would result in a military or even //nuclear response// by the other party. ¶ To make things worse, “ neither side seems to believe the other’s declared policies and intentions, suggesting that //escalation management// , already a very uncertain endeavor, could be//especially difficult// in any conflict,” it says. ¶ Although conflict “mercifully” seems unlikely at this point, the report concludes that “it cannot be ruled out and may become increasingly likely if we are unwise or unlucky.” ¶ The report says: “ With both sides possessing and looking set to retain //formidable nuclear weapons arsenals//, such a conflict would be tremendously dangerous and quite possibly //devastating//.”

Pascual and Huddleston 9 (Carlos – Vice president and Director of Foreign policy – the Brookings Institution, and Vicki – Visiting Fellow, “CUBA: A New policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement”, April, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)

licensing U.S. companies to provide services for the development of Cuban offshore oil and gaswould provide benefits to the//U// nited //S// tates and Cuba. (At this point it should be noted that the Secretary of Treasury has always had and contin - ues to have the authority — as embodied in OFAC regulations — to license any transaction found to be in the U.S . national interest . This power has been used over the past fifteen years by various r epublican and Democratic administrations to license a variety of commercial transaction s be - tween the United States and Cuba). The following are some of the reasons we might wish to become engaged in developing Cuba’s offshore oil and gas. First, if U.S. and other reputable companies are involved in Cuba’s offshore oil development//it would reduce Cuba’s dependence on Venezuela//for two-thirds of its oil imports. Second, it is preferable that U.S. oil companies with high standards of transparency develop these resources rather than, for example, //russia’s notoriously corrupt oligarchy.// Third, U.S. influence in Cuba is likely to increase if U.S. companies have an economic relationship on the ground. Fourth, U.S. companies have //the technology and expertise//to develop Cuba’s offshore oil and gas.

CDA 11 (Center for Democracy in the Americas, “As Cuba plans to drill in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S. policy poses needless risks to our national interest”, 2011, http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/Cuba_Drilling_and_US_Policy.pdf)

6. Cuba would //welcome U.S. investment//. At MINCEX, the staff discussed the impact of the embargo on Cuba’s access to capital.Ministry staff said the //embargo is harmful// to Cuba’s ability to attract foreign investments, capital, and technology. Cuban officials repeatedly emphasized that the country is open to any foreign investor, and that Havana //would welcome U.S. investment//, subject to the same conditions it places on all foreign investors. According to a senior official in Cuba’s diplomatic corps, when Cuba decided to drill off-shore in the Gulf of Mexico in the mid-1990s, the first letters sent by Cuba’s government to invite foreign concerns to participate went //exclusively to U.S. energy companies// .They declined interest, due to the embargo, and Cuba looked for partners elsewhere.

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